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NEW TRIALS AND APPELLATE REVIEW
By
JOSEPH S. LORD, III*

The cry of the wounded lawyer, stung by defeat in a trial by jury, is only slightly less vociferous than that of the unfortunate loser when trials were decided by
combat. It was probably always so, and it probably always will be. But for many
years this vocal anguish was apparently regarded by the bench with something
like amused tolerance and the early courts took no action in respect to jury verdicts
except for actual jury misconduct.'
True, the writ of attaint was available to the disappointed party, but the invocation of this writ involved the selection of 24 jurors to try the twelve
who had rendered the undesirable verdict, and if the verdict was found improper,
the orginal 12 had their goods seized, their houses pulled down and, to catch
anything that might be left, they were fined.2 This drastic remedy was seldom invoked, so that in the normal course of 'events, the occupational cry of the defeated
iawyer went unheeded.
However, in 1655, a now-forgotten advocate charged that the jury "must have
been a packed bu,.iness, 'else there could not have been so great damages". His
plea was so moving that the court granted a new trial because of excessiveness. 3
Thus was born the practice of granting new trials by the court for reasons other
than actual misconduct by the jury.
This practice, of course, has been a traditional part of our Pennsylvania jurisprudence, and it is not intended here to examine the grant of new trials by inferior
tribunals. Rather, the function of this article is to examine the scope and effectiveness of appellate review when such orders granting new trials have been made by
a lower court.
In spite of some early doubts regarding the appealability of an order granting
a new trial, 4 it is now accepted that the right to appeal from an order granting a
new trial does exist and that it is a right derived from the common law. 5 But whethei
that right has substance, or whether it is, in fact, so illusory as to be a practical
nullity, is by no means clear.
True, there exist more or less crystalized rules that would seem to demand
reversal in certain categorized situations. Thus, where the trial court grants a
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Graham v. Graham, I S. & R. 331, 333 (1815).
DeWaele v. Metiopolitan Life Insurance Company, 358 Pa. 574, 584 (1948).
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new trial because of a supposed error of law, which the appellate court decides was
not, in fact, an error, the grant of the new trial will ordinarily be reversed.' And
indeed, it would seem that an appellant should be able to predict reversal with certainty once he has convinced the reviewing court that that trial court was mistaken in
its apprehension of its own error, the only uncertainty being whether or not legal error was in fact committed at the trial. But even in this apparently a fortiori situation,
our appellate courts, by their holdings in other but cognate cases, have thrown a
pall of uncertainty over what should seemingly be a definite rule. For, say the
courts, the action below will not be reversed unless it expressly and affirmatively
appears by certification that the trial court's mistaken conviction of its own error
was the sole reason for the new trial, 7 and even the fact that the court below discussed only one reason for its action does not necessarily mean that this was the
exclusive cause of the new trial. 8 It is apparent that though the court below was
manifestly wrong in concluding that legal trial error had been committed, an appellant cannot predict that the mistake will be righted unless the trial judge's certification accompanies the appeal.
It would seem, too, that where a plaintiff is admittedly entitled to a verdict
against one or both of two tort-feasors, he should never be deprived of his verdict
against one merely because the trial court conceived that both were liable, and both
appellate courts have so held. 9 And yet, in spite of the obvious justice of such a
rule and in spite of the apparent definiteness of the courts' language, it has nonetheless been intimated that even in such a situation, the lower court has the
power to grant a new trial as to all defendants. 10
Where, the layman (or indeed the lawyer) may well ask, is the "known
certantie of the law that is the safety of all"?
But if appellate action in those individual situations is uncertain, there is at
least a semblance of appellate review. The litigant deprived of his verdict has, at
least, the hope of reversal. However, where the trial court cloaks its actions under
the magic formula of "interests of justice" or "weight of the evidence", hope is
virtually gone. Then the litigant is practically at the mercy of a single individual,the trial judge. He whose evidence has been of sufficient compulsion to persuade
twelve jurors, fairly selected from a community cross-section, may still be wrecked
on the reefs of a single individual's personal predilections, belief, background,
philosophy and emotions. Indeed, even to persuade more than twelve jurors is
not enough to stop judicial interference with a verdict, no matter how consistent in
6 Se-Ling Hoisery, Inc. v. Margulies, 364 Pa. 45 (1950) ; see DeWaele v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, s. 5.
7 Reese v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 336 Pa. 299, 301 (1939) ; Steilein et al. v. Vogel, et al.,
363 Pa. 379 (1949).

8 Regan v. Davis, 290 Pa. 167, 170 (1927).
9 Trerotola v. Philadelphia, et al., 346 Pa. 222, 226-7 (1943); Kins v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, et al., 154 Pa. Superior Ct. 29, 31 (1943).
10 Frank v. W. S. I.osier & Co., Inc., 361 Pa. 272, 277 (1949),
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one direction, for a verdict will not be allowed to stand, no matter how many
new trials must be granted to effect the ends of justice. 1 ' We must pause to ask:
whose concept of justice? What divine inspiration is breathed into one man by the
investiture in a robe that clothes him with omniscience? Is it not logical that after,
-not twelve,-but 48 people of the community have been convinced of a party's
case, the matter should rest, and that "weight of the evidence" and "interests of
justice" had both been satisfied? And yet, even after all 48 had found the same
2
verdict, another new trial was granted.'
However, the possible shortcomings of trial courts are not the subject of this
article. Rather, we are concerned with what, if anything, an appellate court will
do about such possible shortcomings.
In the first place, it cannot, of course, be doubted that under our practice the
grant of a new trial on the weight of the evidence, or in the alleged interests of
justice, rests in the discretion of the trial court. 13 But this statement is by no means
the be-all and the end-all, for a proper conception of the meaning of the rule
involves an examination into the meaning of (a) discretion; (b) weight of the
evidence; and (c) interests of justice.
The term "discretion" imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill
so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion. 14 Discretionary power can only exist
within the framework of the law and it is not exercised for the purpose of giving
'effect to the will of the judge. 5 Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of
reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.16
Discretion is abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error of
judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is
misapplied, or where the record shows that the action taken is the result of partiality,
prejudice, bias or ill-will.' 7 And when any of these factors appear, the exercise
8
of discretion is subject to appellate review.'
Thus, both on reason and authority, the mere fact that the grant of a new
trial is "discretionary" constitutes no impediment whatever to a review of the order
on appeal. That this must be so appears from the host of opinions in which the
supreme court states it will not interfere with the trial court's action unless discretion was abused 19 The very use of the word "unless" clearly imports that an abuse
of discretion will be both reviewed and reversed.
11 Maloy v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 Pa. 466, 472 (1918).
12 Sandonawicz v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 129 Pa. Superior Ct. 431 (1937).
18 Bellettiere v. Philadelphia, 367 Pa. 638, 642 (1951) and cases there cited.
14 Paschall v. Passmore, 15 Pa. 295, 304 (1850).
15 Osborn v. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheaton 738, 866 (1824).
16 Dauphin Co. Grand Jury Invest. Proc. (No. 3), 332 Pa. 358 (1938).
17 Mielcuszny v. Rcol, 317 Pa. 91, 93 (1934).
18 N. 16.
19 Tupponce v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 358 Pa. 589 (1948) ; cf. Class & Nachod B. Co. v. Giacobello, 277 Pa. 530, 538 (1923) wherein Chief Justice Moschzisker reviews appeals from the

grant of new trials.
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Thus, (1) discretion is not and cannot be absolute; and (2) its abuse will be
reversed on appeal. What magic meaning, if any, is implicit in the phrase "weight
of the evidence" that would make the rule any different? What is, in fact, the meaning of the phrase?
We know, of course, that weight of the evidence never rests upon mere numbers of witnesses. 20 Rather, it has been defined as evidence which has the effect
of inducing belief, 21 or that credibility is the measure of weight.22 Considering
together both ot these criteria, each of which has been approved by the supreme
court, it would seem to be a legitimate inference that evidence which induces belief is credible evidence, so that a verdict rendered in accordance therewith would
be supported by the weight of the evidence. Conversely, evidence which does not
induce belief is not credible. A verdict rendered upon evidence of the latter type
would appear, therefore, to be against the weight of the evidence. Were these
propositions the guideposts in the consideration of motions for new trials, there
would at least be definable standards. Of course, the question must always recur:
evidence which induces belief in whose mind? For it would appear to be an
a fortiori propo:ition that where twelve jurors render a verdict, the evidence of
the prevailing party must have induced belief. If "credibility is the touchstone of
testimony in the measure of its weight" and if the jury alone is to pass upon its
value,2 3 then obviously when belief has been induced in the minds of 12 people, and
12 people to whom has been committed that function have found the evidence credible, it would seem to be anomalous to say that their finding was against the weight
of the evidence. Obviously, their very verdict determines that the weight of the
evidence was the way they found. And to argue further that evidence is incredible because it did not induce belief in the mind of one person, although it did in
the minds of 12, cannot, it seems to us, withstand any logical scrutiny.
However, so long as the trial judge has the power to set aside a finding of
fact on his reaction to the evidence, it would certainly seem that where the evidence
does not induce belief in this omnipotent mind, a verdict rendered thereon would
bL against the weight of the evidence, at least according to the trial judge's standard
of weight. And yet, perversely enough, we find courts saying that the weight
of the evidence was distinctly in favor of the non-prevailing party, and yet refusing
a new trial.2 4 In one case, both the trial judge and the supreme court thought the
jury should have found differently, thus implying that the prevailing side's evidence
did not induce belief in their minds, and yet both the inferior and the appellate
courts refused a .iew trial.2 5 The court has even said that a refusal of a new trial
will not be distrubed, even though the weight of the evidence was with the appel20
21
22
28
24
25

Braunschweiger v. Waits, 179 Pa. 47, 51 (1897).
N. 20.
See Henes v. McGovern, 317 Pa. 302, 312 (1935).
Lindemanin v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 251 Pa. 489, 493 (1916).
Brown v. Philadelphia and Reading R R. Co., 2 Wood. 144, 145 (1863).
Kelly v. Traction Co., 204 Pa. 623 (1903).
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lant.2 1 Once again, then, we find decisions turning on the application of a phrase
whose meaning is uncertain, undefined and as variable as the courts wish to make
it, and whose effect is equally variable.
Coming now to the phrase "the interests of justice". In our opinion, this
language has been tortured by the courts far beyond its original meaning. So fai
as we can determine its first use in connection with the grant of a new trial was in
Cleveland Worsted Mills Company v. Myers-Jolesch Co., 266 Pa. 309 (1920).
There the trial judge conceived that he had charged erroneously on the measure
of damages and awarded a new trial. The lower court stated that "in the interest
of justice a new trial should be granted, in order that the plaintiff may have the
measure of damages properly submitted to a jury". Defendant appealed and thc
supreme court affirmed, saying, at page 311:
"Defendant now appeals from the order granting a new trial, averring an abuse of discretion because, as it alleges, the charge to the jury was
correct. We cannot so hold, however, for the 'interest of justice' may well
demand a new trial be granted in order that an important question in the
cause may be so raised on the record as to permit of its consideration on
appeal, and this whether or not it was properly decided at the trial".
It is quite apparent that at its inception "the interests of justice" was used
in connection with legal, and not factual, error. Today, however, the words are
used in all cases where new trials are granted, not because of demonstrable or
supposed legal error, but because of the judge's feeling. There is no doubt that
emotion enters into any jury verdict. But does not at least a "legalistic emotion"
enter where the judge, who is, after all, simply another human being, considers
the evidence against his own emotional or philosophic background? 27 When the
phrase "interests of justice" is used, unsupported by reasoning, as it so frequently
it, it is often the case of a thirteenth juror undoing the act of the other 12.
There would appear to be no rational basis for concluding that this thirteenth
individual's perception of "the interests of justice" is significantly more acute
that the perception of the other 12. Indeed, in Aaron v. Strausser, 360 Pa. 82
(1948), the late Chief Justice Maxey quoted with approval this language (pps.
85-86):
" "The average judgment of 12 jurymen of average sense,
drawn, as they are, from all walks of life and impartially selected .. .
is more likely-to reach a practical result in sifting, weighing, rejecting,
reconciling proof, and deciding facts than is that of the trained and technical reasoner or specialist whose mind runs in the groove of artificial
analysis and logic; for peradventure men do not usually get into trouble
through ' logical processes, and logicians cannot always get them out of
it,:***

26 Hegarty v. Berger, 304 Pa. 221, 227 (1931).
2'7 A Judge Takes the Stand, by Joseph Ulman (1933), c. V, pp. 52-66.
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Logicians certainly would have difficulty in reconciling this language with the
appellate courts' insistence that the interests of justice are practically co-extensive
with the trial judge's reaction to the proof.
We have gone thus at length into "discretion", "weight of the evidence"
and "interests of justice" to show what an ephemeral and at times contradictory
nature they have. This is important, because if discretion must be exercised with
the law, and not blindly, it would seem that the appellate courts should at least
erect the standards to be followed. Otherwise, the concepts of "weight" or of
"justice" can and do vary with the individual judge. As a result, lawyers may predict with some. certainty,-not what the law is,-but what a particular judge is
likely to do. The result of this, in turn, is an unseemly "jockeying for position",
with constant maneuvering to set a particular case before a particular judge. No more
undesirable result can be imagined, but it will contine so long as the appellate
courts shun review whenever the magic words are used.
The curious and distressing fact is the total inconsistency of the appellate
courts. A new triil, they say, will not be granted on a mere conflict in the evidence.2 8
Nevertheless, new trials have been granted and the order has remained undisturbed where there was only a conflict in the evidence. 2 9 Although the supreme
court has stated that it has not abdicated its reviewing function in such cases as
these,3 0 and although the court itself has referred to the phrase "in the interest
of justice" as a "somewhat cryptic explanation", 81 the hard fact is that in the
vast majority of cxses where the lower court uses that phrase, the Supreme Court
looks away.
Out of all the new trials granted on the weight of evidence, or in the interest
of justice (or both) that have been appealed to the Supreme Court, we can find
but four instances of reversal.3 2 One of those88 was a case where the lower court
conceded plaintiff's right to a verdict, but erronously concluded that thee exculpated defendant had been negligent as a matter of law. Another8 4 was a case
where the appealing defendant, against whom a new trial had been awarded,
was entitled to binding instructions as a matter of law, and reversal followed as
a matter of coutse. Neither of these cases, then, represents a real, independent
appraisal of the evidence by the appellate court in order to determine for itself
whether, in reality, the verdict was against the weight of the evidence or against
the interest of justice.
28 Harmer v. America' Railway Express Co., 269 Pa. 271 (1921).
29 Campbell v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 366 Pa. 484 (1951); Bellettiere v. Philadelphia,
367 Pa. 638 (1951).
80 Jones v. Williams, 358 Pa. 559, 564 (1948).
81 Fritz( Admrx. v. York Motor Express Co., 358 Pa. 398, 401 (1948).
832Jones v. Williams, 358 Pa. 559 (1948); Fritz, Admrx, v. York Motor Express Co., n. 31
366 Pa. 134 (1950).
Martin, et al. v. Arnold, 366 Pa. 128 (1950) ; Stewart, et vir. v.Ray, et al.,
88 Jones v. Williams, n. 32.
84 Fritz, Admrx. v. York Motor Express Co., n. 31.
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The first indication that the court was cognizant to the point of action of
its admitted duti. to review the record for itself85 came in two cases decided in
1950.86 In the Martin case, there was a verdict for plaintiff against both defendants, with a new trial awarded as to one. The other defendant appealed. Mr.
Justice Chidsey, not content with time-worn reliance on a phrase, painstakingly
reviewed the evidence and concluded independently that the verdict was not against
the weight of the evidence. The oider was reversed. In the Stewart case, there was
a verdict for plaintiff against one defendant only, and a verdict 'for the other def'endant. Plaintiff's motion for new trial as to both was granted. The exculpated
defendant appealed. Again, Justice Chidsey reviewed the evidence and held that
discretion had been abused.
The method of approach and the action taken by the court in these last two
cases we conceive to be the true exercise of judicial review. But apparently whatever progression was made in those cases was doomed to an equivalent retrogression.
In Campbell v. PhiladelphiaTransportation Co., 366 Pa. 484, decided January 2,
1951, 8 the court not only reverted to its former aloof position, but retreated even
further. There, in spite of all its previous pronouncements that a new trial will not
be granted on a nere conflict, 88 the court solemnly repeated the old formula and
affirmed, including in its opinion, incredibly enough, the statement that "The
evidence is in complete conflict". But the court went even beyond that manifest
inconsistency. It said (page 485).
"***Neither in this conflicting testimony, nor in any part of this
record, have we been able to find any settled facts that so strongly support
plaintiff's case as to persuade us that thL trial court has abused its discretion.***"
Thus, now, in order to prevail with any certainty, a party must (a) convince
the jury; and (b) produce "settled facts" that "so strongly support" his case that
the trial judge or the appellate court will also be persuaded. Truly, this turn of the
law is incomprehensible when conrtsated with cases where a new trial was refused
0
even though the trial judge, 89 or both the trial judge and the appellate court4
thought the weight was with the losing party.
Actually, in the Campbell case, the record shows that the trial judge charged
(record, p. 78a):
85 Jones v. Williams, n. 32.
86 Martin v. Arnold and Stewart et vir. v. Ray et al., n. 32.
87 We should confess immediately that the writer both tried and argued this case and we therefore
invite an independent examination and appraisal of the record.
88 n. 28.

89 Campbell's Lessee v. Sproat, 1 Yeates 327, 328
judge who tried the cause, inclined that the weight
is no ground for awarding a new trial, that the jury
rule otherwise, such motions would greatly multiply

ensue."
40 n. 25.

(1794) where the court said, "Though the
of the evidence was with the plaintiff, yet it
have differed from him in opinion. Were the
on us, and the greatest inconveniences would
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I* *The thing that this case rests or falls on is this: Was that automobile across these two tracks and partly over to the other track when
this trolley car plowed into it? That is the big point in this case***."
The physical evidence, supplied by a disinterested witness, showed that a side
skid mark from plaintiff's automobile began at a point between the two sets of
tracks, thus supplying apparently incontrovertible evidence that the automobile
was partly over to the other track when struck. Apparently, we must now ask: What
are "settled facts"?

The most recently reported case on the subject is Belletierre v. Philadelphia,
367 Pa. 638, decided June 27, 1951. There, the plaintiffs brought suit for personal
injuries sufferecd as a result of a collision between the automobile driven by the
husband plaintiff and a fire engine. The husband was brought on the record
as additional defenidant in the action of his wife and daughter. The jury's verdict
was for all plaintiffs against the city. The lower court granted the city's motion
for a new trial. The lower court's opinion (record, page 170a), after summarizing
the testimony, justified its ruling on the following asserted factors: (1) that the
plaintiffs were not disinterested witnesses; (2) that the testimony of the firemen
as to the sounding of the siren and the bell was positive testimony; (3) that
there was not enough evidence to show the city's recklessness; (4) the vedicts
may have been excessive; (5) that under the circumstances in the interests of
justice a new trial should be granted. In affirming, Mr. Justice Stern reviewed the
testimony, but failed to discuss the validity of any of the reasons advanced by
the trial court for its action. Rather, he inferred, without any sanction from the
opinion of the lower court, that the lower court had an additional but hidden reason,
namely, that tbe verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The opinion then
went on to buttcess this absent but inferred reason by pointing to the testimony
of alleged disintcrested witnesses, and the fact that the plaintiff's story as to speeds
and distances could scarcely be regarded as convincing. What the court did not
mention was: (1) that the fire truck driver's testimony was totally at variance with
his statement given to the police immediately after the accident (record, pages
98a-99a); (2) that although the engine was answering an alarm, it was going
20 miles per hour, slowing to 10 miles per hour at the intersection (according to the
firemen's testimony, record, 100a); (3) that three of the alleged disinterested
witnesses were indoors and removed from the intersction (record, pages 107a, 11Oa,
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lila); and (4) that the city's estimates of speeds and distances, together with the
41
admitted point of impact, was inherently improbable.
The net effect of the Bellettiere holding is to throw into the path of effective
appellate review a still further obstacle that did not previously exist; that is, the
imputation to the trial court of a reason that the lower court itself did not advance, with support for the non-existent reason advanced, not by the trial court,
but by the appellate court which did not see or hear the witness'es.
Mr. Justice Bell, in his concurring opinion, would review only for "fraud
or collusion", basing his suggestion, not on the conscience of the lower court
42
en banc, but on what the trial judge might sense from the atmosphere of the trial.
Thus, Justice Bell would remove all traditional restraints from the asserted exercise of discretion and would repose in one man,-the trial judge,-absolute power.
The trial judge's action could be arbitrary, whimsical, biased and prejudiced, could
violate all established concepts of legal discretion, but if it stopped short of fraud
or collusion, there would be no possibility of correction. Such a suggestion, we believe, is at sharp variance with all our traditions of the jury system and the reviewing function of our appellate courts, and finds no support in our system of
Jurisprudence.
The record of the supreme court in the review of orders granting new trials
leads to the inescapable conclusion that the aggrieved party's "right" of appeal is
in reality a right without substance. Although the court has denied that it has abdicated its reviewing function, it has certainly not exercised that function in any practical sense. It has, on the contrary, paid lip-service to a right, and promptly taken all
value from the right by worship of an empty, confusing and largely meaningless
phrase,-the weight of the evidence and the interests of justice.
The reason for this apparent apathy, inertia, or mere reluctance to review, of
course, does not lie in the mere statement that the trial court is invested with discretion. We must seek the reason for the imposition of such discretion and then
examine its validity.
The accident idmittedly occurred at the middle (record, p. 117a) of the intersection of two
26 foot wide streets with 12 foot sidewalks (record, p. 92a). Under the best view of city's evidence,
the fire truck was going 10 m.p.h., or approximately 15 feet per second (record, pp. 90a, 105a).
The additional defendant was going 20-30 m.p.h., or 30-45 feet per second. The fireman said the
additional defendant was 60-70 feet from the intersection when the fire truck was between the near
house line and curb line, so that the additional defendant traveled 60-70 feet, plus one-half of the
intersection (13 feet), or 73-83 feet, while the fire truck traveled 19 feet. Obviously, were this
testimony true, the fire truck would have cleared the intersection before the collision, or at most,
the fire truck would have been struck in the rear, although admittedly its front struck the middle
of the other car (record, pp. 95a, 159a). Conversely, if the fire truck at 10 m.p.h covered 19 feet,
the automobile would have had to cover 4 times that much in the same time, and no witness said
Bellettiere was going as much as 40 m.p.h., or 4 times as fast as the fire truck. Bellettiere's testimony
on the other hand (record, pp. 23a-25a) withstands the scrutiny of mathematical analysis in light
of the admitted facts.
42 367 Pa. 638, 645.
48 March v. Philadelphia & West Chester Trac. Co., 285 Pa. 413, 418 (1926); Campbell v. Phila.
Transportation Co., 366 Pa. 484, 485 (1950).
41
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Most frequently, when the appellate court gives any reason at all for investing the trial conit with such broad powers, it is that the trial judge, who saw
and heard the witnesses, is best able to decide the weight to be given to their
testimony.4" Historically, however, the very opposite approach obtained. The
Nisi Prius judges who were sent from Westminster with commissions, 44 had jurisdiction only to tly the cases and had no power to grant new trials. 45 Even today,
the English Rules of Court of 1883 provide that "no judge shall sit on the hearing
of any motion for a new trial in any cause or matter tried with a jury before himself".46
However that may be, though, our courts have consistently relied upon the
ground that the trial judge, having seen and heard the witnesses, is best able to
judge the weight of the evidence.
Whatever superficial cogency there may be in this reason, however, disappears
under closer scrutiny of the authorities, because actually the order granting a new
trial is not that of the trial judge, but of the court en bane.47 It is the duty of all
4
the judges to sit together, hear the motion, meet and discuss the matters present, s
and if more than one judge is not available, a judge from another district must be
called in to sit with the trial judge. 49 But beyond this, if a majority of the court
en banc feels that a new trial should be refused50 or granted, 5 1 the majority will
prevail, even tho,.gh the trial judge disagrees.
Obviously, the judges of the court en banc (other than the trial judge) did
not see or hear the witnesses and must decide from the same record presented to an
appellate court. It is equally clear that the non-trial judges below have no greater
insight into the witncsses or the evidence than has the appellate court. It would
seem, therefore, that the special ability to weigh the evidence attributed to the
trial judge is of doubtful significance. We are unwilling to concede that our
appellate judges and justices are less capable than our lower court jurists of examining and appraising accurately the record of a trial.
The sum and substance of all this is simply that the reasoning of our appellate
courts in their opinions reviewing orders granting new trails is both inconsistent
and confusing, and that appellate review of such orders is totally inadequate. What,
if anything, is the s3lution?

44 Statute of Westminster, 2d, 13 Edw. I, c. 30.
45 Cf. Balmforth v. Pledge (1866) L. R. Q. B. 427, 431.
46 Order XXXIX. r. 2.
47 Kearney v. McCauley, 360 Pa. 255, 258 (1948).
48 Dobson v. Crafton Borough, 315 Pa. 52, 55 (1934).
49 Zimmerman v. Penna. R. R. Co., 293 Pa. 264, 266 (1928).
50 Dobson v. Cratton Borough, n. 48.
51 See Grail v. Philadelphia, 273 Pa. 275, 293 (1922).
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Probably most important is a more vigorous enforcement by the supreme
(ourt of its own Rule 43. 52 A mere statement that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence, or that the interests of justice demand a new trial, is not the
statement of a reason, but the statement of a conclusion. The supreme court should
require the court below to state why the interests of justice demand a new trial, or
in what particulars the verdict was against weight of the evidence. The court
should be compelled to specify, with references to the record, whatever inconsistencies in or incredible portions of the testimony motivated its action. A step in this
direction was taken by Mr. Justice Stern in the Bellettiere case, 63 but a statement of
the exact reasons for a new trial should be mandatory, rather than merely desirable.
Proper enforcement of Rule 43 would accurately inform counsel and the court of
why the discreticn was exercised below. Quite possibly, with a succinct and specific
statement of reasons bIefore him, counsel would be deterred from prosecuting
unmerited appeals. Certainly, such a rule would have the effect of containing discretion within legally defined limits, subject to intelligent and accurate review.
Rule 43, as lower courts now interpret it, is totally without meaning in practically all cases where new trials are granted on the weight of the evidence or in the
interests of justice. Properly enforced, it would compel lower courts to state the sole
reasons (as opposed to conclusions) for their action. There would then be no
necessity for the "certificate" rule and the appellate court would be enabled to
appraise intelligently the propriety of action taken below. The opportunity of the
appellate court for appraising and balancing the weight of the evidence and the
interests of justice would be at least as favorable as that of the judges of the lower
court en banc who did not sit at the trial. We point out in passing that as written,
Rule 43 is mandatory, but in view of the present lack of enforcement, it is almost
precatory.
It may be that the court is fearful of a spate of appeals if its rigid attitude
is relaxed. As we have pointed out, a literal compliance with Rule 43 would
probably go far toward discouraging many appeals which now proceed blindly.
Perhaps, however, it would be well to consider the advisability of adopting a rule
of certiorariin respect to new trials, similar to the rule of the Supreme Court of
the United States. Certainly, no tribunal in the world is more subject to bombardment by the litigious than that one. Yet the requirement that at least four judges
favor certiorari has been eminently successful in limiting the work-load of that
court. A similar rule in Pennsylvania would require merely that all justices read
the record in cases of appeals from new trials. If three judges favored hearing
the case, briefs and argument would be ordered. The court would be thus enThat rule requires the appellant to give notice of the appeal, and goes on to provide that ***the
court below shall forthwith file of record at least a brief statement, in the form of an opinion of
the reasons for the ruling, crder, judgment or decree therein referred to, or shall specify in writing the
place in the record where such reasons may be found, and this opinion or writing shall be attached to
the record and printed as part thereof."
68 367 Pa. 638, 644.
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sured of hearing only meritorious (although not ntcessarily revirsible) causes.
There would be saved the time of the court spent on the arguments and consideration of, and opinions in unmeritorious cases. Litigants would be spared expense.
But more important, jury verdicts would have more meaning. Verdicts would be,
in a sense, creatures of substance and body, instead of will-o-the-wisps which
may vanish at any moment by the mere incantation of the magic formula "weight
of the evidence and interests of justice".

